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KEEPING REGIONALISM UNDER
'CONTROL' OF THE MULTILATERAL




The rapid increase in regional trade agreements (RTAs) is a noticeable
trend in international trade today. There have been more than 350 RTAs
in force notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and this num-
ber will grow over time. The worldwide proliferation of regional arrange-
ments has provoked a lot of discussions about its implications for the
multilateral trading system. Some would underscore the complimentary
nature of RTAs, others would indicate negative effects on the multilateral
trade regime, with none of these views being able to uniformly reflect the
complexity of the current picture of world trade. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to revisit the WTO tools designed to keep regionalism within its
reach. We will evaluate the state of play in three areas of the WTO do-
main-rule-making, multilateral review and dispute settlement-and see if
there is any room for improvement of WTO's "control" functions in each
of these fields.
I. INTRODUCTIONREGIONAL trade agreements (RTAs) have become an important
component of the international trade order. They typically take
the form of free trade agreements (FTAs) or customs unions
(CUs). FTAs eliminate duties and regulatory trade restrictions between
contracting parties, while CUs additionally harmonize commercial poli-
cies of their members vis-A-vis third countries.'
With preferential treatment for designated countries, RTAs constitute
an exception to the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), which is introduced to preserve non-discrim-
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1. For details, see infra, section Ill.A.
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ination among all its members.2 A legal framework for RTAs within the
WTO system is provided by Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article V of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), and the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Fa-
vourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries (Enabling Clause).3
The rapid increase in RTAs has been a prominent feature of interna-
tional trade relations in recent times. As of March 1, 2013, there are 363
RTAs in force, with 200 FTAs and sixteen CUs notified under GATT
Article XXIV, thirty-six agreements notified under the Enabling Clause
and 111 agreements notified under GATS Article V.4 These figures are
based on the number of notifications, whereby the same agreement noti-
fied for goods and services separately is counted twice. But, the physical
number of RTAs-counting goods and services together-amounts to
241, which can be further broken down as 133 (goods), one (service) and
107 (goods and services). 5 As seen from Figure 1, regional trade activities
have significantly intensified from the mid-1990s onwards.6 With a persis-
tent impasse in the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions, regionalism will likely continue to grow.7
2. PErm VAN DEN BossciHE, TH1E LAW AND POLICY OF THE WoRu TRADE ORGAN-
IZATION: TExI, CASES AND) MATERIALS 650 (2005).
3. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of "Systemic" Issues Related
to Regional Trade Agreements-Note by the Secretariat, 1 10, WT/REGIW/37
(Mar. 2, 2000).
4. Summary Tables Containing WTO Figures on RTAs, WTO, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
publicsummarytable.aspx (last updated Mar. 1, 2013).
5. Id.
6. Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/region-e/regfac-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
7. For an in-depth explanation of the evolution of RTAs, see WTO Secretariat, World
Trade Report 2011, The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-Exis-
tence to Coherence, 48-91 (2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/
booksp e/anrep-e/world-trade-reportl 1_e.pdf.
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Figure 1. RTA Trends (1948-2012)8
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Apart from their increasing numbers, RTAs have produced a multitude
of rules and regulations that apply across countries in parallel with WTO
disciplines. Regional arrangements and the WTO share the same goal of
trade liberalization, albeit with different depth and scope. The relation-
ship between the multilateral trading system and RTAs has proved to be
a very complex issue provoking different reactions among commentators
and policy makers. As noted by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy:
Some would emphasize a clash of systems and inherent inconsisten-
cies between discriminatory and non-discriminatory approaches to
trade relations. Others would point to the growing prominence of
[RTAs] as a reflection of the demise of multilateralism. Others still
would assert that regional and multilateral arrangements are in es-
sence complementary and need to be fashioned accordingly. None
of these perspectives can singly capture the complexity of interna-
tional trade relations in a globalizing world.9
This controversy surrounding the WTO-RTA relationship naturally
raises the question as to how far the WTO's "controlling" mechanisms
can reach. The WTO treats RTAs in three basic ways: rule-making, mul-
tilateral surveillance, and dispute settlement procedures. The principal
bodies in charge are, respectively, (1) the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council, (2) the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
(CRTA) and the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), and (3)
panels and the Appellate Body.10 This article aims to take stock of the
WTO work in these three directions and consider issues for its future
8. See Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, supra note 6.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Regional Trade Agreements: Committee, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/region-e/regcom-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
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agenda. For this purpose, we will first discuss the hierarchical structure of
the WTO-RTA legal order, and then examine each of the areas of WTO's
control.
II. WTO AGREEMENT AS SUPERIOR TO RTAS
As both the WTO AgreementI and RTAs are treaties-legally binding
inter-governmental agreements,'12-the nature of the relationship be-
tween the WTO and RTAs can be established on the basis of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).' 3 According to previous
studies,14 it is Article 41 of the VCLT which characterizes their relation-
ship in a most appropriate way.' 5 Namely, paragraph 1 of Article 41 al-
lows a subset of the parties to a multilateral treaty (e.g., the WTO
Agreement) to conclude an agreement (e.g., RTA) to modify the former
with the legal effect arising to these parties only:
Article 41
Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the
parties only
1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude
an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone
if:
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the
treaty; or
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty
and:
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of
their rights under the treaty or the performance of their
obligations;
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object
and purpose of the treaty as a whole.16
11. This article refers to the "WTO Agreement" as a collective term for all WTO legal
instruments agreed to by members as a "single undertaking." The title "Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization" (or the "Marrakesh
Agreement") is used in this article in a narrower sense for the agreement (the
WTO "Charter") consisting of sixteen articles that define the legal status of the
WTO as an international organization. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994).
12. In particular, the Appellate Body explicitly referred to the WTO Agreement as a
"treaty." Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 15,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DSI1/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
13. See Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Constitutional Functions of the WTO and
Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND) [TiE WTO
LEGAL SysTEm 43, 53-58 (Lorand Bartles & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).
14. Id. at 54-55; JAMES H. MAnIns, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GAT/
WTO: ARTICLE XXIV AND TIE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT 274-83 (2002).
15. Article 30 of the VCLT, infra note 16, is also relevant, but of less practical impor-
tance. See MATHIs, supra note 14, at 273-74; see also Cottier & Foltea, supra note
13, at 53-55.
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 41.1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
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Subparagraph (b) of VCLT Article 41.1 applies where the text of the
treaty is silent on the modification issue.17 Since the WTO Agreement
explicitly acknowledges the possibility for an RTA conclusion,18 it is sub-
paragraph (a) which is more pertinent to the WTO-RTA relationship.' 9
This provision implicitly establishes the superiority of the WTO Agree-
ment.2 0 Accordingly, RTAs entered into by WTO members must comply
with relevant substantive and procedural requirements of GATT Article
XXIV, GATS Article V and the Enabling Clause, as elaborated in subse-
quent WTO instruments.2 1
Besides this conventional "treaty vs. treaty" approach to the WTO-
RTA relationship, another interesting approach can be explored from the
Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks case. There, Mexico's tax on certain bev-
erages, which negatively affected imports from the United States, was
found to be a discriminatory measure in breach of the GATT principle of
national treatment.22 In response, Mexico invoked Article XX(d) of the
GATT that provides justification for illegal measures "necessary to se-
cure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of [the GATT]."23 Mexico asserted that the tax was intro-
duced as a countermeasure to induce the United States to comply with
the latter's obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) regarding market access conditions for Mexican sugar. 24 But,
17. MATHis, supra note 14, at 276.
18. Article XXIV:5 of the GATT states "the provisions of this Agreement shall not
prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a cus-
toms union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement neces-
sary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area." General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 1.L.M. 1154 (1994), art. XXIV:5,
available at https://www.wto.org/english/res e/booksp-elanalyticindex-e/gatt
1994 09 e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter GATT]. Article V:1 of the
GATS states "[t]his Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a
party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or
among the parties to such an agreement." General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1 B, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), art. V:1, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs e/legal e/26-gats_- 01_e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter
GATS]. Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause, read together with paragraph 2(c),
permits RTAs between developing country members "[nlotwithstanding the provi-
sions of Article I of the General Agreement." Decision of 28 November 1979 on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries, 1 1, (L/4903) (Dec. 4, 1979) [hereinafter Enabling
Clause].
19. Cottier & Foltea, supra note 13, at 55-56.
20. Id. at 56.
21. See infra, sections IlA, IV.A.
22. Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 9
8.59, 8.96, 8.123, 8.155-57, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) (adopted Mar. 24, 2006)
[hereinafter Mexico Panel Report].
23. GATT,supra note 18, art. XX(d); Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures
on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, n.106, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006)
(adopted Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Mexico Appellate Body Report].
24. According to Mexico, prior to this case, it initiated "NAFTA dispute settlement
proceedings" to challenge U.S. non-compliance "with its obligation under the
NAFTA relating to market access for Mexican sugar to the [U.S.] market." Be-
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the panel and the Appellate Body dismissed Mexico's defense on the
grounds that, inter alia, the NAFTA was not covered by the Article
XX(d) exception.25 Notwithstanding this negative finding, the legal inter-
pretation provided by the Appellate Body left some room for RTAs to
fall under Article XX(d). More specifically, the Appellate Body made it
clear that the term "laws or regulations" in this provision comprises
"rules that form part of the domestic legal system" 26 and cited the EC's
statement below as a supplementary explanation:
It is entirely possible that international agreements may be incorpo-
rated into the domestic legal order in such a way that they can be
invoked as against individuals, and enforce[d] against them. If this is
the case, the international agreement, albeit international in origin,
may be regarded as having become an integral part of the domestic
legal order of such Member, and thus a law or regulation within the
meaning of Article XX (d) [of the] GATT [1994].27
In other words, although "laws or regulations" generally refer to do-
mestic rules, RTAs may still fall under this concept if they have direct
effect within the member's legal order without requiring implementing
legislation. For the purpose of the Article XX(d) defense, such RTAs
must be "not inconsistent with the provisions of [the GATT]." 28 Thus,
the WTO-RTA relationship in the context of Article XX(d) can be con-
sidered from the "treaty vs. domestic law" perspective under which the
GATT as part of the WTO Agreement takes precedence over the RTA as
part of domestic law.2 9 It is true that the possibility for RTAs to fall
within the ambit of Article XX(d) will hardly materialize, but the Mex-
ico-Taxes on Soft Drinks case shows that it is not completely ruled out.
Having established the superiority of WTO law over RTAs concluded
by WTO members, we will proceed now to examine, in the following
parts, how this supremacy is secured and enforced in practice.
III. RTAs AND WTO RULE-MAKING
Rule-making is a significant part of WTO activities. Main stakeholders
here are members of the organization which are represented, for the pur-
poses of rule-making, at the level of the Ministerial Conference or the
General Council. They decide which rule to adopt, modify or annul. This
cause of the persistent opposition of the United States to the panel establishment,
Mexico had no choice but to adopt the retaliatory tax "to compel the United States
to comply with its obligations and [to] protect [Mexico's] own legal and commer-
cial interests." Mexico Appellate Body Report, supra note 23, at n. 106.
25. Mexico Panel Report, supra note 22, 9 8.191-197; Mexico Appellate Body Re-
port, supra note 23, $1 69-71.
26. Mexico Appellate Body Report, supra note 23, 1 69-70 (emphasis added).
27. Id. n. 149.
28. Id. 1 70.
29. Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, states "[e]ach Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." The "annexed
Agreements" here include, inter alia, the GATT.
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section starts with an overview of the existing WTO disciplines designed
to ensure that regional arrangements facilitate trade within a preferential
area and do not raise barriers to trade of outside countries.30 The second
part of this section will discuss the state of new rule-making initiatives in
the Doha negotiations and possible alternatives.
A. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING DISCIPLINES
Some of the GATT, GATS and Enabling Clause provisions on regional
trade specify procedural issues, such as notification and multilateral re-
view of RTAs. As observed below, most of these procedures have, as a
matter of fact, been superseded by a new transparency process. Since the
transparency process will be discussed in section IV on the multilateral
surveillance, this part will mainly focus on substantive aspects of RTAs.
1. GATT Article XXIV
Article XXIV of the GATT imposes a number of internal and external
requirements for RTAs. The internal requirement specifies certain stan-
dards for the liberalization of trade between RTA countries. In particu-
lar, both an FITA and a CU must remove the "duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce" (except for certain restrictive measures) on
"substantially all the trade" (SAT). 31 The coverage of SAT may vary de-
pending on the type of RTA. For CUs, it applies either to the entire intra-
regional trade or only trade in products originating in members' territo-
ries.32 As for FTAs, it is only "trade in products originating in [those]
territories" that are covered by the SAT concept. 33
The external requirement essentially aims to prevent negative effects
vis-A-vis non-parties. As far as FTAs are concerned, the "duties and
other regulations of commerce" towards third countries at a post-FTA
stage must "not be higher or more restrictive" than those maintained at a
pre-FTA stage. 34 In the case of CUs, the requirement not to raise trade
barriers "on the whole" applies to "the general incidence of the duties
and regulations of commerce,"35 implying that the "pre-and-post" com-
parison for CUs, unlike FITAs, should be carried out not on an item-by-
item basis but with respect to the whole range of subject products.36 An
additional external requirement for CU members is to apply "substan-
30. See GATT, supra note 18, art. XXIV:4; see also GATS, supra note 18, art. V:4; see
also Enabling Clause, supra note 18, $1 3(a).
31. GATT, supra note 18, art. XXIV:8. The external and internal requirements of
Article XXIV may be invoked in relation to concrete RTA-related measures, such
as e.g., a ban on the use of duty drawback schemes within a preferential trade
regime. See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, Duty Drawback and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: Foes or Friends?, 16 J. INT' ECON. L. 587, 600-607 (2013).
32. GATT, supra note 18, art. XXIV:8(a)(i).
33. Id. art. XXIV:8(b).
34. Id. art. XXIV:5(b).
35. Id. art. XXIV:5(a).
36. MIrsuo MATssUiirrA ET AL., THi WORuiD) TRADE ORGANIZAIiON: LAw, PRAC-
TICE, AND PouIcY 564 (2d ed. 2006).
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tially the same duties and other regulations of commerce" vis-A-vis third
countries.37 Should a CU member raise its MFN tariff to satisfy this re-
quirement, it must generally provide "compensatory adjustment" for
non-CU members pursuant to GATT Article XXVIII.38
Some elements of Article XXIV (mostly procedural issues)-e.g., the
evaluation of the "general incidence" of trade instruments in CUs, the
"reasonable length of time" for the formation of RTAs, review of RTAs,
dispute settlement and etc.-are further elaborated in the Understanding
on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994 (Understanding on Article XXIV).3 9 In particular,
the Understanding stipulates that the general incidence of duties must be
evaluated on the basis of "an overall assessment of weighted average
tariff rates and of customs duties collected," whereas the assessment of
the general incidence of regulations of commerce may include "individual
measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected." 40 It
also makes it clear that free-trade areas or CUs are to be completed, as a
principle, within a "reasonable length of time" of "10 years," or more for
"the exceptional cases." 4 1
2. GATS Article V
Article V of the GATS uses a broader concept of "economic integra-
tion" agreements that are required to have "substantial sectoral cover-
age" in terms of number of sectors, trade volume and modes of supply,
with no a priori exclusion of any mode of supply allowed. 42 In addition,
RTAs within the meaning of the GATS must eliminate existing measures
or prohibit new ones that are discriminatory in the sense of the national
treatment clause.43 Article V also introduces special and differential
treatment for developing countries, such as flexible definitional require-
ments for services agreements and more favorable conditions for juridical
persons owned or controlled by developing country's natural persons. 44
As with the counterpart provisions for the goods sector, the GATS re-
quires that agreements do not raise pre-RTA barriers towards third coun-
tries.45 Procedures of Article XXI of the GATS will apply if services
RTAs entail modification of WTO commitment schedules of parties.46
37. GATT, supra note 18, art. XXIV:8(a)(ii).
38. Id. art. XXIV:6.
39. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
10-24 e.htm [hereinafter Understanding on Article XXIV].
40. Id. 2.
41. Id. 3.
42. GATS, supra note 18, art. V:1.
43. Id. art. V:1(b).
44. Id. art. V:3.
45. Id. art. V:4.
46. Id. art. V:5.
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3. Enabling Clause
The Enabling Clause is applicable to RTAs-regional or global ar-
rangements-between or among developing country members. Such
RTAs provide for "the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of
non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another." 4 7 Obvi-
ously, this definition loosens the internal requirement for South-South
RTAs by allowing tariff reduction and omitting the SAT standard. The
external requirement is worded in less detail. Notably, RTAs must be
designed "not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade
of any other contracting parties," and must "not constitute an impedi-
ment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to
trade on a most-favored-nation basis." 4 8
B. THE WORK ON IMPROVEMENT OF RULES
In the Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2001, WTO members
launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations which is cur-
rently still ongoing. As many parts of the WTO provisions on RTAs are
ambiguously worded, the members agreed to "negotiations aimed at clar-
ifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO
provisions applying to regional trade agreements." 49 In order for the
WTO rules to better accommodate the special needs of developing coun-
tries, the members also agreed that the negotiations must "take into ac-
count the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements."50
The Doha negotiations on RTAs have so far succeeded in reforming
multilateral procedures,5 1 but have not yet produced any tangible result
on substantive provisions (basically "systemic issues"). In this regard, a
most recent report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules
indicates persistent gaps in members' positions, and appeals for a "prag-
matic, flexible and less doctrinaire approach." 52 As is evident from Table
1, members have so far made twenty-one submissions on systemic issues.
Most of the proposals have concerned SAT, as well as special and differ-
ential treatment for developing countries. With respect to SAT, a num-
ber of proposals suggested the setting of a minimum benchmark for SAT
to be measured pursuant to quantitative and/or qualitative assessments of
trade flows and tariff lines.5 3 As for developmental aspects of RTAs, sev-
47. Enabling Clause, supra note 18, 2(c).
48. Id. $ 3(a)-(b).
49. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, $ 28,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
50. Id.
51. See infra, section IV.
52. Report by Ambassador Dennis Francis, Chairman, Negotiating Group on Rules,
Negotiations on Regional Trade Agreements: Systemic Issues, T9 7-9, TN/RL/W/
253 (Apr. 21, 2011).
53. Id. $ 4.
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eral proposals suggested incorporation of additional flexibilities for de-
veloping countries in the existing WTO rules on RTAs.54 In the light of
minor progress, the negotiators have recently considered a new proposal
for a forward-looking, post-Doha work program on all systemic issues,
but have been unable to bridge the gap in their views.55
Table 1. WTO Member Submissions on Systemic Issues
Document
Symbol Document Date Submitted by Key Points
TN/RL/W/250 Jan. 26, 2011 Bolivia Developmental aspects of RTAs56
TN/RL/W/190 Oct. 28, 2005 Japan Quantitative and qualitative
benchmarks for SAT 57
TN/RL/W/187 Sept. 12, 2005 Chile, Korea Best Practice for RTAs/FTAs in
Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation 58
TN/RL/W/186 Aug. 3, 2005 Chinese Taipei Open regionalism via accession
clause for non-parties59
TN/RL/W/185 July 22, 2005 China Developmental aspects of RTAs,
SAT, transitional period,
retroactivity60
TN/RLIW1182 June 9, 2005 Chinese Taipei Open regionalism via accession
clause for non-parties61
TN/RL/W/180 May 13, 2005 Australia SAT, implementation period,
special and differential treatment 62
TN/RLIW/179 May 12, 2005 European SAT, transition periods, "other
Communities regulations of commerce,"
(EC) developmental aspects63
TN/RL/W/173/ Mar. 3, 2005 Australia SAI 6 4
Rev.1
54. Id. 9 5.
55. Id. $ 6.
56. Submission by Plurinational State of Bolivia, Negotiations Aimed at Clarifying and
Improving Disciplines and Procedures Under the Existing WTO Provisions
Applying to Regional Trade Agreements-A Proposal to Clarify Developmental
Aspects of Regional Trade Agreements, TN/RL/W/250 (Jan. 26, 2011).
57. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements, Paper by Japan, TN/RL/W/190 (Oct.
28, 2005).
58. Best Practice for RTAs/FTAs in APEC, Communication from Chile and the
Republic of Korea, TN/RL/W/187 (Sept. 12, 2005).
59. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Paper by the Separate Custom Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, TN/RL/W/186 (Aug. 3, 2005).
60. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by China, Paper by China, TN/RL/W/
185 (July 22, 2005).
61. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmnen and Matsu, Paper by the Separate Custom Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, TN/RL/W/182 (June 9, 2005).
62. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by Australia, Paper by Australia, TN/
RLIW/180 (May 13, 2005).
63. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the European Communities, Paper
by the European Communities, TN/RL/W/179 (May 12, 2005).
64. Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by Australia, Paper by Australia, TN/
RL/W/173/Rev.1 (Mar. 3, 2005).
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TN/RL/W/173 Mar. 1, 2005 Australia SAT 65
TN/RL/W/165 Oct. 8, 2004 Japan Developmental aspects of RTAs as
to SAT, transition period, and
parameters for tariff preferences
under Enabling Clause RTAs6 6
TFN/RL/W/163 Sept. 13, 2004 Chile Coverage of services RTAs 6 7
TN/RL/W/155 Apr. 28, 2004 African, Developmental aspects of RTAs as
Caribbean and to SAT, transition period, and
Pacific (ACP) parameters for Enabling Clause
States RTAs6 8
TN/RL/W/152 Apr. 26, 2004 Chile Clarification issues under GATS
Article V6 9
TN/RL/W/151 Apr. 23, 2004 Chile Preliminary ideas for substantive
discussions70
TN/RL/W/116 June 11, 2003 Korea "Other regulations of commerce,"
"other restrictive regulations of
commerce"
7 1
TN/RL/W/1 14 June 6, 2003 India SAT, rules of origin, sanitary/
technical requirements, trade
remedies, grandfathering 7 2
TN/RL/W/32 Nov. 25, 2002 Turkey SAT, rules of origin, regulatory
harmonization, developmental
aspects7 3
TN/RL/W/14 July 9, 2002 EC and member Scope of systemic issues for
countries clarification7 4
TN/RL/W/15 July 9, 2002 Australia SAT 7 5
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25, 2002).
Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the European Communities and
their Member States, Communication from the European Communities, TN/RL/W/
14 (July 9, 2002).
Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by Australia, Communication from
Australia, TN/RL/W/15 (July 9, 2002).
Submission on Regional Trade Agreements: Key Issues for Consideration,
Communication from Australia, TN/RL/W/2 (Apr. 24, 2002).
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While recognizing that priority should be given to multilateral negotia-
tions, we suggest that if the Doha Round continues to be in a deadlock,
members should utilize alternative modes of rule-making, such as author-
itative interpretations or amendments.77 More specifically, the Ministe-
rial Conference and the General Council could resort to their "exclusive
authority to adopt interpretations" under Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh
Agreement.78 The Appellate Body stated that such "multilateral inter-
pretations are meant to clarify the meaning of existing obligations, not to
modify their content."79 Since the clarification of SAT, the term "other
restrictive regulations of commerce" and some other controversial con-
cepts used in the existing WTO provisions will hardly alter members'
rights and obligations, the interpretation envisaged by Article IX:2 could
indeed be a useful tool. The Article IX:2 procedure can be triggered by a
recommendation of the Council overseeing the functioning of the rele-
vant agreement, i.e. the Council for Trade in Goods (for RTAs under the
GATT and the Enabling Clause) and the Council for Trade in Services
(for RTAs under the GATS), followed by a final decision taken by a
three-fourths majority of the members.80 Although the Ministerial Con-
ference or the General Council will first seek to reach an agreement by
consensus, voting will remain the last-resort option.8
Amendments under Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement could be
resorted to as an alternative to the multilateral interpretation track. A
pertinent proposal to the Ministerial Conference may be put forward by
either a member or a relevant Council. The Ministerial Conference then
decides by consensus, or failing that by a two-thirds majority, whether to
submit the proposal to members for acceptance. 82 The legal effect of the
proposed amendment depends on its nature. If the amendment intends
to "alter the rights and obligations" of the members, it will take effect, as
a principle, for the accepting members only, provided that it has been
approved by at least two thirds of the members.83 But the amendment
that would not modify the existing rights and obligations will be effective
77. Mary E. Footer observes that principal rule-making in the WTO materializes
through formal treaty-making processes and secondary treaty rules such as multi-
lateral interpretations or amendments that revise or modify primary treaty rules.
See MARY E. FOOTER, AN INsTrurTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 181-270 (2006).
78. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, art. IX:2.
79. Appellate Body Reports, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Ecuador / European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, $ 383,
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (Nov. 26,2008) (adopted Dec. 11, 2008) / WT/DS27/AB/
RW/USA (Nov. 26, 2008) (adopted Dec. 22, 2008).
80. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, art. IX:2.
81. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Note by the
Secretariat: Proposals on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health: Thematic Compilation, 1 8, IP/C/W/363/Add.1 (July
23, 2002).
82. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, art. X:1.
83. Id.
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for all members upon acceptance by a two-thirds majority.84 The deter-
mination as to which of these two categories is the case is to be made by
the Ministerial Conference once it decides to submit the proposal to the
members for acceptance.85 As for the GATS, the legal effect of an
amendment depends not on changeability of rights and obligations but
the part of the agreement which is to be amended.86 For instance, the
amendment of GATS Article V, which is contained in Part II of the
agreement, would apply, as a principle, solely to accepting members.87
It is noteworthy that the demarcation line between "non-altering"
amendments and authoritative interpretations seems to be blurred as in
both situations there would be no fundamental change in members' status
under current rules.88 If members prefer to use "non-altering" amend-
ment procedures with a lower two-thirds threshold rather than the proce-
dures for authoritative interpretation, the probability of approval will be
higher. In any event, the attractiveness of multilateral Interpretations or
amendments consists in the fact that the voting possibility for either pro-
cedure undoubtedly provides members with more space for maneuver
than if they were to decide by consensus. This legitimately available way
of rule-making has already been resorted to in the WTO with respect to
intellectual property and public health,89 and could be used for RTA is-
sues as well.
Finally, a few words are worth noting with regard to the rule-making on
WTO procedures for RTAs. Notably, as part of the Doha negotiations,
the General Council adopted the Decision of 14 December 2006 entitled
"Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements" (2006 Deci-
sion).90 The text of this decision introducing, on a provisional basis, a
special transparency mechanism (TM) for regional arrangements may
give the impression that the new transparency process co-exists with the
corresponding procedures set forth under the original WTO provisions
related to RTAs.91 At the same time, the decision calls for a reappraisal
of the TM whereby members will "review the legal relationship between
84. Id. art. X:3.
85. Id. art. X:4.
86. Id. art. X:1.
87. Id. art. X:5.
88. The delineation between authoritative interpretations and amendments may not
always be an easy exercise. See, e.g., FOOTER, supra note 77, at 265.
89. See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Decision of 6 Decem-
ber, 2005, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005).
90. General Council, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Deci-
sion of 14 December 2006, WT/L/671 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Decision].
91. See, e.g., id. at preamble ("[h]aving regard also to the transparency provisions [of
the WTO provisions on RTAs] .... ); id. 9 1 (on "Early Announcements" stating
"[wJithout prejudging the substance and the timing of the notification required
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, Article V of the GATS or the Enabling
Clause, nor affecting Members' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements
in any way . . . ."); id. 5 (on "Procedures to Enhance Transparency" stating
"without affecting Members' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements
under which it has been notified, the RTA shall be considered by Members. . . .").
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this Mechanism and relevant WTO provisions related to RTAs." 92 Since
the simultaneous use of both the old (examination) procedures on RTAs
and the transparency process under the 2006 Decision is virtually impossi-
ble for practical reasons, we can at least speak of a de facto replacement
of the previous procedures by the new ones.93 But, for the purpose of
greater clarity, this replacement should explicitly be reflected in a legal
text in the future before the TM will be operating on a permanent basis.
IV. RTAS AND WTO MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE
The "control" functions of the WTO concerning RTAs are not confined
to rule-making. In this section, we will examine the mechanism of multi-
lateral reviews of RTAs which falls within the purview of WTO's bodies.
This track is a product of rule-making initiatives and has certain implica-
tions for judicial reviews of regional arrangements.
A. FROM LEGAL SCRUTINY To TRANSPARENCY PROCESS
The multilateral oversight of individual RTAs in the previous GATT
1947 system was conducted by separate working parties, with the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES having played an overall coordinating role. In
the WTO period, the task of working parties was transferred by the 1996
Decision of the General Council to the newly-created Committee on Re-
gional Trade Agreements (CRTA) with the following terms of reference:
[T]o carry out the examination of agreements in accordance with the
procedures and terms of reference adopted by the Council for Trade
in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services or the Committee on
Trade and Development, as the case may be, and thereafter present
its report to the relevant body for appropriate action.94
The purpose of such examinations was to give a legal assessment of
whether an RTA under review was compatible with multilateral trade
rules. But the obscure language of the provisions on RTAs and the con-
sensus-based decision-making procedures were the main hurdles in
reaching any definitive findings. Only the CU between the Czech Repub-
lic and the Slovak Republic was an exceptional case where the GATT
working party was able to reach a clear-cut conclusion about its full com-
patibility with the GATT.95 The unequivocally positive determination
here was possible, in our opinion, mainly because the CU in question
inherited all necessary elements-the common commercial policy and the
absence of internal barriers to trade-that had already existed in the sin-
gle country (Czechoslovakia) to which the RTA parties used to belong
92. Id. $ 23.
93. See Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO and PTAs: A Preference for Multilateralism? (or,
the Dog that Tried to Stop the Bus), 44 J. WORLD TRADE 1145, 1149 (2010).
94. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 6 February 1996, 1(a),
WTIL/127 (Feb. 7, 1996).
95. See GAIT, Working Party on the Customs Union between the Czech Republic
and the Slovak Republic-Report, 1 9, L/7501 (July 15, 1994).
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just before this union was formed. 96
With the adoption of the 2006 Decision, multilateral reviews are now
conducted under the TM which possesses a number of novel features,
such as uniform procedures for all RTAs, early announcements, specific
time-limits, a greater Secretariat's role, and the counter-notification and
consideration of agreements. 97 The TM consists of: (1) early announce-
ments, (2) notification, (3) transparency process, and (4) subsequent noti-
fication and reporting of changes. To give more detail, early
announcements are required for RTAs under negotiation, or newly
signed but not yet in force.98 Once the agreement is concluded, member
parties must notify it with specification of the WTO provision under
which it is notified.99 The transparency process represents, in essence, the
process of considering notified RTAs by WTO membership within either
the CRTA (for RTAs falling under the GATT and GATS) or the CTD
(for RTAs falling under the Enabling Clause). The emphasis on "consid-
eration" (instead of "examination") implies that the TM does not address
the issue of the legal compatibility of RTAs with WTO rules, as it used to
be before. 00 For the purposes of the transparency process, member par-
ties must provide the Secretariat with the necessary data, and the Secreta-
riat must prepare a factual presentation for each notified agreement, or
factual abstracts for RTAs which were examined prior to the TM
launch.o'0 Finally, the parties are required to notify any changes affecting
the implementation or operation of RTAs, and submit, at the end of the
RTA's implementation period, a short report on the fulfillment of liberal-
ization commitments in the RTA.10 2 Table 2 shows the state of play in
the multilateral review of RTAs to date.
96. See id. T1 5-6.
97. See Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, Checking RTA Compatibility with Global Trade
Rules: WTO Litigation Practice and Implications from the Transparency Mecha-
nism for RTAs, 45 J. WORLD TRA)i 529, 537-40 (2011).
98. See 2006 Decision, supra note 90, T 1-2.
99. See id. 91 3-4.
100. See Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 538-39.
101. See 2006 Decision, supra note 90, 9 7, 18, 20-22.
102. See id. 9 14-15.
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Table 2. RTAs under the WTO Multilateral Process (as of
1 March 2013)103
Enabling GATS GATT Article
Status Clause Article V XXIV Grand total
Factual Presentation not 12 32 80 124
distributed
Factual Presentation on hold 0 4 0 4
Factual Presentation 4 54 76 134
distributed
Factual Abstract not 0 0 0 0
distributed
Factual Abstract distributed 11 21 43 75
Report adopted 1 0 17 18
No report 8 0 0 8
Grand total 36 111 216 363
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWS OF RTAs
The current TM has a number of important implications for WTO dis-
pute settlement dealing with RTA-related issues. First, with no further
need for a multilateral judgment as to the RTA's legality under WTO law,
the TM has drawn a clear borderline in the jurisdiction between the
WTO's political bodies (the CRTA and the CDT) and judicial bodies
(panels and the Appellate Body).104 We recall that in the past some com-
mentators were concerned about an impairment of the balance of politi-
cal and judicial powers in the WTO caused, as they argued, by an
Appellate Body's finding in Turkey-Textiles. In that case, the Appellate
Body held that panelists were entitled to review the overall consistency of
an RTA with WTO rules-the competence, which in the commentators'
view, should be attributed to the political bodies only.105 However, we
believe that the TM has now dismissed their concern.
Second, the 2006 Decision requirement that RTAs should be notified
and the provision(s) under which the RTAs are notified should be speci-
fied' 06 will also play its role in WTO litigation. As will be considered in
section V, for a legal defense for an RTA-related measure found to be
WTO-inconsistent, a respondent must prove that the invoked RTA itself
103. See WTO, supra note 4 (note: for RTAs notified to the GATT 1947 and covered by
paragraph 22 (a) of the 2006 Decision, the status "Report adopted"/"No report"
indicates whether or not a GATT 1947 working party conducted an examination of
such agreements and issued a report.
104. Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 540.
105. See Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Politi-
cal Organs of the WTO, in NEw DIRECrIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOIIN H. JACKSON 325, 339-345 (Marco Bronckers & Rein-
hard Quick eds., 2000); Youri Devuyst & Asja Serdarevic, The World Trade Or-
ganization and Regional Trade Agreements: Bridging the Constitutional Credibility
Gap, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'i_ L. 1, 65-72 (2007).
106. See 2006 Decision, supra note 90, $T 3-4.
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complies with the relevant WTO provisions. The Understanding on Arti-
cle XXIV stipulates that CUs or FTAs, to be consistent with Article
XXIV, must satisfy, inter alia, the notification requirement therein,107
which is further detailed in the 2006 Decision. Thus, for the purpose of
the WTO-consistency test under Article XXIV, panelists should check,
inter alia, whether the agreement at issue is properly notified. Although
the Understanding above is applicable to RTAs falling under Article
XXIV, we do not see any reason for why the compatibility with the notifi-
cation requirement should not be similarly checked for RTAs falling
under the GATS and the Enabling Clause. To sum up, only RTAs appro-
priately notified to the WTO should be considered for the purposes of
defense under GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V, or the Enabling
Clause, as the case may be.1os
Third, there should be parallelism between notifications and legal de-
fenses when it comes to the application of the relevant WTO provisions.
For instance, if an RTA is notified under Article XXIV, a member party
should be allowed to rely only on this provision, and not the Enabling
Clause. Otherwise, "rule shopping" may take place when that party ex-
pects more successful defense under the Enabling Clause for a tariff re-
duction provided to its RTA partner alone. 109 The awareness of such a
parallelism "principle" may sometimes bring about controversies be-
tween RTA parties and non-parties over the provision under which notifi-
cation is to be done. The choice between Article XXIV and the Enabling
Clause was questioned in the case of e.g., Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR), the FTA between China and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Gulf Cooperation Council CU." 0
Moreover, the parallelism "principle" seems to, at least partly, cause the
problem of dual notifications-the situation where the same agreement is
notified by different parties under both Article XXIV and the Enabling
Clause. For example, the India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership Agreement (CEPA) and the Korea-ASEAN FTA were notified
under Article XXIV (by Korea) and the Enabling Clause (by India and
ASEAN members respectively).I Such a dissimilar choice may proba-
107. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 39, $ 1.
108. See Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 540-541.
109. Id. at 541-543.
110. See GATT, Latin American Integration Association, Information on Measures
Taken by Member Countries of the Association in 1991 under the 1980 Treaty of
Montevideo, L/6985 (Mar. 5, 1992); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the
Centre William Rappard on 14 July 1992, at 34-46, C/M/258 (Aug. 4, 1992); Com-
mittee on Trade and Development, Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Cooperation between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the
Parties to the Agreement-Addendum, at 1-2, WT/COMTD/51/Add.2 (Feb. 8,
2006); Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Gulf Cooperation Council Cus-
toms Union-Notification from Saudi Arabia-Corrigendum, WT/REG222/N/1/
Corr.1 (Mar. 31, 2008); Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Fifty-first Ses-
sion-Note on the Meeting of 27-28 November 2008, at 19 25-35, WT/REG/M/51
(Dec. 19, 2008).
111. For the India-Korea CEPA, see Committee on Regional Trade Agreements Coun-
cil for Trade in Services, Notification of Regional Trade Agreement-Republic of
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bly originate from the different anticipation of the parties as to what pro-
vision could secure a more favorable finding in a possible dispute with
their participation in the future. However, should both parties to the
agreement be involved in the same dispute,' 1 2 panelists would likely have
difficulty in choosing an applicable rule. To preclude this, we will argue
in the next subsection that the TM should be revised accordingly.
Fourth, the WTO Secretariat's factual presentations-which do not
have "any value judgment" and are used as reference materials during
the consideration of RTAs-"shall not be used as a basis for dispute set-
tlement procedures or to create new rights and obligations for Mem-
bers." 13 This clause serves to alleviate members' concern that the
information they submitted as part of their notification obligation"14
could be used against them in future WTO litigations." 5 Thus, complain-
ants are banned from invoking factual presentations against RTA parties
in dispute settlements, while respondents may still rely on factual
presentations for the purpose of a legal defense. This ensures that infor-
mation in factual presentations will be used not against but in the interest
of the notifying member.' 1 6
Korea and India, WT/REG286/N/1, S/C/N/558, (July 1, 2010); Committee on Trade
and Development Council for Trade in Services, Notification of Regional Trade
Agreement-India and the Republic of Korea, WT/COMTD/N/36, S/C/N/570
(Sept. 29, 2010). For the Korea-ASEAN FTA, see Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements Council for Trade in Services, Notification of Regional Trade Agree-
ment-The Republic of Korea and the Member Countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), WT/REG287/N/1, S/C/N/559 (July 8, 2010);
Committee on Trade and Development Council for Trade in Services, Notification
of Regional Trade Agreement-Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam, WT/COMTD/
N/33, S/C/N/560 (July 8, 2010). For an online database of diverse resources regard-
ing Korea's socio-economic development including FTA policy, see K-
Developedia, KDI SCHooL OF PuBIc PoIcv AN1) MANAGEMENT, https://www.
kdevelopedia.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
112. A single complaint can be brought against both parties to the same RTA when
both of them have adopted an identical measure to implement the RTA. The prac-
tice of lodging a single complaint against several WTO members took place in
several dispute settlements. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Argentina, Eu-
ropean Union and a Member State-Certain Measures Concerning the Importation
of Biodiesels, WT/DS443/1 (Aug. 17, 2012); Request for Consultations by Brazil,
European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/
DS409/1 (May 12, 2010); Request for Consultations by the United States, Euro-
pean Communities and Certain Member States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1 (Oct. 6, 2004).
113. 2006 Decision, supra note 90, [[ 9-12.
114. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the 2006 Decision, the Secretariat's factual presenta-
tion "shall be primarily based on the information provided by the parties." Id. [ 9.
115. See Negotiating Group on Rules, Background Note by the Secretariat: Compen-
dium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, 1 17-20, TN/RLIW18/Rev.1
(Aug. 1, 2002).
116. See Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 543-47.
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C. PROSPECTS
1. TM Reforms
The TM has in general been highly praised for its important role in
ensuring transparency in and understanding of RTAs." 7 The 2006 Deci-
sion requires members to "review, and if necessary modify" the current
TM, and make it a permanent mechanism. 1 8 In this regard, the Chair-
man of the Negotiating Group on Rules recently issued a revised TM
draft where some of the proposed modifications are put in square brack-
ets due to the lack of agreement among members. 119
Two of the bracketed changes are especially noteworthy and should, in
our opinion, be fully endorsed. The 2006 Decision leaves the possibility
for separate notifications of the same agreement by different parties.
Thus, the first proposal is to require all member parties to an RTA to
jointly submit an early announcement, notification, and subsequent re-
port.120 Should the proposed language be approved, it will effectively
solve the dual-notification problem mentioned above, as the parties will
have to choose together only one provision for their notification. The
second proposal is to place the transparency process for all RTAs under a
single body-the CRTA.121 Because the CRTA and the CTD are both
open to the entire membership, and RTA parties are subject to the same
data requirements, 12 2 we do not see any compelling reason against this
idea of integrating the transparency procedures.123 The biggest advan-
tage of this proposal is the increased efficiency of the TM work, because
RTA reviews under a single body would avoid unnecessary duplications
in the system resulting from separate considerations of the same agree-
ment in the CRTA and the CTD triggered by dual notifications. Moreo-
ver, this proposal obviates the need for the ongoing debate in the WTO
on the appropriate forum for consideration of systemic implications of
RTAs for the multilateral trading system and enables members to get an
overall picture of the systemic implications of all regional arrangements.
The next part of our analysis evaluates the WTO work on such systemic
implications.
117. Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the Chair of the Negotiating
Group on Rules, Ambassador Valles Galmes, TN/RL/25 (May 6, 2010).
118. 2006 Decision, supra note 90, $ 23.
119. Negotiating Group on Rules, Negotiations on Regional Trade Agreements: Trans-
parency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, TN/RL/W/252 (Apr. 21,
2011).
120. Id. 3.
121. Id. T 18.
122. See 2006 Decision, supra note 90, Annex.
123. For a persuasive argument in support of the single TM process, see Negotiating
Group on Rules, Review of the RTAs Transparency Mechanism Under Paragraph
23: Proposal for the Consideration of All R TAs in a Single WTO Committee, T 6,
TN/RL/W/248 (Jan. 24, 2011).
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2. Systemic Implications of RTAs
In 1997, the CRTA agreed to deal with "systemic issues"-questions of
cross-cutting concern-under a three-pronged approach, including: (1) le-
gal analysis of relevant WTO provisions, (2) horizontal comparisons of
RTAs, and (3) a debate on the context and economic aspects of RTAs.12 4
Given the continued expansion of regionalism and persistent deadlock in
the Doha negotiations, the importance of systemic issues has increased
dramatically. Not surprisingly, a growing number of WTO members has
called for the clarification of the interaction between RTAs and the multi-
lateral trading system so as to ensure mutual complementarity. In this
context, a large group of developed and developing country members led
by Australia jointly proposed for the Eighth Ministerial Conference (Ge-
neva, December 15-17, 2011) a draft decision with the following content:
Ministers noted the growth and increasing prominence of RTAs in
world trade. They noted with satisfaction the extensive information
on RTAs made available under the Transparency Mechanism and
emphasized that its further success will depend on Members' contin-
ued efforts, including submitting relevant information in a timely
manner. Ministers also saw value in WTO Members assessing the
systemic implications of RTAs for the multilateral trading system
and the relationship between them, within the mandate of the Com-
mittee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). Accordingly, Minis-
ters directed the CRTA to undertake a work programme where
Members would be assisted by factual reports to be prepared by the
Secretariat, to consider the elements, practices and development as-
pects of RTAs. This work programme could help Members reflect
on the systemic implications of RTAs for the multilateral trading sys-
tem and discuss practices that can help further the objectives of the
multilateral trading system. The results of this work programme will
be reported to the Ninth Ministerial Conference of the WTO.125
The joint proposal, in essence, calls upon the CRTA to examine cross-
cutting issues with a view of determining systemic impacts of RTAs for
the WTO system. Originally, this initiative came out in response to previ-
ous appeals by some WTO officials for the improvement of the multilat-
eral surveillance "through . .. highlighting better the common elements in
different RTAs" and the adoption of a more focused working program
thereon. 126 However, the Ministerial Conference failed to adopt the pro-
posed decision, so that its Chairman simply noted in his concluding state-
ment that many members stressed the need to address systemic
124. Negotiating Group on Rules, Informal Open-Ended Meeting with Senior Officials:
25 November 2009, TNIRL/W/246 (Nov. 27, 2009).
125. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, A Proposal from Australia; Canada;
Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; European Union; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Mexico;
New Zealand; Norway; the Republic of Korea; and the Separate Customs Territory
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, $ 1, WTIREGIW/63/Rev.1 (Oct. 25, 2011).
126. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Communication from Argentina; Aus-
tralia; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; New Zealand and
the Republic of Korea, 1 2, WT/REGIW/54/Rev.2 (Nov. 10, 2010).
2013]REGIONALISM UNDER MULTILATERAL "CONTROL" 347
implications of RTAs and report to the Ninth Ministerial Conference. 127
The opponents of the proposal in question-mainly developing country
members-have, on several occasions, voiced concerns about possible
overlaps with the Negotiating Group on Rules, the relationship between
the TM and the anticipated working program, benchmark-setting implica-
tions for future RTAs, the coverage of RTAs to be reviewed, the role of
the Secretariat, and other emerging issues. 128 However, the main sticking
point has been a seeming conflict of jurisdiction between the CRTA and
the CTD as to the operation of the proposed program. 129 On the one
hand, the CRTA has a clearly-defined mandate "to consider the systemic
implications of such agreements and regional initiatives for the multilat-
eral trading system and the relationship between them, and make appro-
priate recommendations to the General Council." 130 The term
"agreements" here refers to "all bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade
agreements of a preferential nature."131 On the other hand, the CTD's
terms of reference are to "serve as a focal point for consideration and
coordination of work on development" in the WTO, and "consider any
questions ... with regard to ... the application .. . of special provisions in
the [WTO agreements and decisions] in favor of developing country
Members and report to the General Council for appropriate action."132
In a nutshell, while the CRTA has an explicit competence to consider
systemic implications of apparently all types of RTAs,133 the CTD's man-
date for developmental issues can also be said to implicitly include sys-
temic implications of those RTAs that have a bearing on development. 134
It appears to us that the CRTA's explicit mandate should be inter-
preted taking into account two facts. First, the CRTA was, in principle,
contemplated as a sole body in charge of the examination of all notified
127. World Trade Organization, Chairman's Concluding Statement: Eighth Ministerial
Conference, pt. II, WT/MIN(11)/11 (Dec. 17, 2011).
128. See, e.g., Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 18-19
September 2012, 11 25-29, WT/REG/M/66 (Sept. 26, 2012); Committee on Re-
gional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 20 March 2012, $1 17-33, WT/
REG/M/64 (Apr. 16, 2012); Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on
the Meeting of 9 and 15 November 2011, T$ 29-58, WT/REG/M/63 (Jan. 17, 2012);
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 22 and 23 Sep-
tember 2011, 1 20-33, WT/REG/M/62 (Nov. 4, 2011).
129. See, e.g., Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 20
March 2012, 9$ 17, 20, 30, 32-33, WT/REG/M/64; Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 9 and 15 November 2011, 19 23, 29, 37, 44-48,
WT/REG/M/63.
130. Decision of 6 February 1996, supra note 94, 1(d).
131. Id. n. 1.
132. Committee on Trade and Development, Decision by the General Council on 31
January 1995, 1 1, 4, WT/L/46 (Feb. 23 1995).
133. This is what especially developed countries have argued. See, e.g., Council on Re-
gional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 18-19 September 2012, 11 22-24,
27 WT/REG/M/66 (Sept. 26, 2012).
134. This is what developing countries have argued. See, e.g., Council on Regional
Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 20 March 2012, $1 17, 20, 24, 30, 32,
WT/REG/M/64 (Apr. 16, 2012).
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RTAs.' 3 S Indeed, the general practice prior to the establishment of the
TM was that the RTAs falling under the GATT, the Enabling Clause and
the GATS were notified to, respectively, the Council for Trade in Goods,
the CTD, and the Council for Trade in Services that then could transfer
the agreements to the CRTA for examination. 136 Second, with the estab-
lishment of the TM, the situation has changed: the task of the multilateral
surveillance of individual RTAs is now divided between the CRTA and
the CTD. Therefore, the CRTA's mandate established in the 1996 Deci-
sion cannot be read in isolation from new developments initiated by the
2006 Decision on the TM.
We recall that the 2006 Decision is subject to change given the provi-
sional nature of the TM. To settle the jurisdictional problem, we propose
two alternative approaches depending on what final transparency process
will be established. If the final decision on the TM continues to endow
both the CRTA and the CTD with the responsibility to consider RTAs
under their purview, then the systemic-effect analysis should logically be
divided between these two bodies accordingly. In this case, the final deci-
sion should be recognized as superseding the 1996 Decision in relevant
parts. Alternatively, but in our view more desirably, if the final decision
provides the CRTA with the exclusive authority to consider RTAs, this
body should be solely responsible for the review of systemic implications,
as well.
Given the disagreement over the proposal tabled by Australia and its
partners, members should reenergize their consultations with a view to
developing a new approach to the systemic issues.' 37 Alongside the clari-
fication of the CRTA/CTD mandate, they should ensure that this will be
a member-driven process which will target respective RTAs taken collec-
tively, without prejudice to the legitimacy of individual agreements, and
will not introduce mandatory templates for future RTAs to follow. Need-
less to say, they should also specify the list of cross-cutting issues from
which systemic implications will be drawn out, the nature of reference
materials to be prepared by the Secretariat, the coverage of subject agree-
ments in the light of their notification and consideration statuses, and
other technical matters.
V. RTAS AND WTO JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
The third area where the WTO can fulfill its "control" functions to-
wards RTAs and enforce the relevant rules is dispute settlement. Unlike
135. This can be inferred from the CRTA's terms of reference. See section IV.A, supra.
136. It is true that CRTA's examination of RTAs under the Enabling Clause and the
GATS was not a common practice, but the CRTA could, in principle, examine
these agreements if it was requested so by the CTD or the Council for Trade in
Services respectively. See Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
(CR TA), WORi I) TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/re-
gion-e/regcome.htm (last visited July 28, 2013).
137. See, e.g., Council on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 18-19
September 2012, 1 26, WT/REG/M/66 (Sept. 26, 2012).
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rule-making and the multilateral surveillance, this field is limited only to
RTAs involved in disputes that are handled by a small group of adjudica-
tors-panels and the Appellate Body. With the TM focusing on trans-
parency issues, the litigation procedures take on added importance by
providing the only avenue where the WTO-compatibility of regional
agreements can be scrutinized.
A. JUSTICIABILITY OF RTAs
Under the GATT 1947 system, the question whether RTAs could be
examined in dispute settlement procedures was addressed in three panel
reports. In EC-Citrus, the panel concluded that given that "the exami-
nation-or re-examination-of Article XXIV agreements was the re-
sponsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES," and in the absence of a
decision by the contracting parties on this matter, it would not be appro-
priate for the panel to determine whether preferential agreements at is-
sue conform to Article XXIV.138 In EEC (Member States)-Bananas I,
the panel considered the relationship between Articles XXIV and XXIII
(dispute settlement) and observed that if a measure related to Article
XXIV could not be examined in dispute settlement procedures, "any con-
tracting party, merely by invoking Article XXIV, could deprive other
contracting parties of their rights under Article XXIII."139 It also re-
ferred to panel's authority to handle balance-of-payment disputes in spite
of the existence of multilateral procedures under GATT Article
XVIII:B.140 In the later EEC-Bananas II case, the panel held that since
the Lomd Convention comprised non-GATT parties contrary to Article
XXIV:5 (that states that the GATT does not prevent RTAs "as between
the territories of contracting parties"), it was not an agreement of the
type covered by Article XXIV.14 1 For this reason, the panel eventually
concluded that Article XXIV could not justify the inconsistency with
MFN of tariff preferences for bananas accorded to the ACP countries. 142
All three panel reports were not adopted, and are thus of limited legal
importance.
After the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the justiciabiliy of RTAs
was greatly clarified in the Turkey-Textiles case. At issue were quantita-
tive restrictions on Indian textile products that Turkey said were neces-
sary for the completion of its CU with the EC, and hence justified under
138. GATT Panel Report, European Community-Tariff Treatment on Imports of Cit-
rus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, 1 4.6, 4.15, L/
5776 (Feb. 7, 1985) (unadopted).
139. GATT Panel Report, EEC-Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, 367,
DS32/R (June 3, 1993) (unadopted).
140. Id. 365.
141. GATT Panel Report, EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, 1 163, DS38/R (Feb. 11
1994) (unadopted).
142. Id. 19 156-64.
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Article XXIV.143 The panel referred to paragraph twelve of the Under-
standing on Article XXIV which stipulates that WTO dispute settlement
procedures could be initiated in relation to "any matters arising from the
application of . .. Article XXIV."144 It construed the term "any matters"
as being confined to "specific measures" taken to implement an RTA
(such as Turkey's quota at issue), rather than the RTA (the CU) per se. 14 5
Therefore, it found that a WTO-compatibility test for the Turkey-EU CU
as a whole would fall under the jurisdiction of the CRTA, not the
panel. 146 However, the Appellate Body decision 47 dismissed the latter
finding by indicating that RTAs are, in fact, justiciable in the WTO. This
can be inferred from the first of the following two conditions defined by
the Appellate Body as necessary for an Article XXIV defense:
First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate
that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a cus-
toms union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a)
and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that party must demon-
strate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented if
it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue... [B]oth these
conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under
Article XXIV.
We would expect a panel, when examining such a measure, to re-
quire a party to establish that both of these conditions have been
fulfilled. It may not always be possible to determine whether the
second of the two conditions has been fulfilled without initially de-
termining whether the first condition has been fulfilled.148
The Appellate Body's confirmation of RTA justiciability has a very im-
portant implication for dispute settlement dealing with regional trade is-
sues. It opens the door for judicial reviews of RTAs on both fronts:
where a legal defense is sought, and arguably where complaints target
RTAs per se. Although the question of WTO-consistency of RTAs is
more likely to be raised in defense cases as suggested by the litigation
practice to date,14 9 RTAs per se as disputable (or actionable) measures
may, in principle, be complained of before WTO adjudicators. 5 0
143. See Panel Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Prod-
ucts, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) (adopted Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey
Panel Report].
144. Id. 9.49.
145. Id. 9T 9.49-53.
146. Id. $ 9.52.
147. See Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Cloth-
ing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) (adopted Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter
Turkey Appellate Body Report].
148. Id. 58-59 (emphasis added).
149. For possible reasons of the judicial inaction on RTAs, see, e.g., Petros C. May-
roidis, If I Don't Do It, Somebody Else Will (Or Won't): Testing the Compliance of
Preferential Trade Agreements with the Multilateral Rules, 40 J. WORLDr TRADE
187, 207-213 (2006).
150. See Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 532-534.
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B. THE WTO-COMPATIBILITY ISSUE IN PRACTICE
In Turkey-Textiles, the panel did not consider whether the CU be-
tween Turkey and the EC is a valid RTA. Instead, it simply assumed
arguendo that the CU complies with the requirements of Article
XXIV.s'5 It explained its omission of the CU examination with the lack
of panel's jurisdiction and judicial economy. Because this point was not
appealed, the Appellate Body did not conduct the compatibility test on
its own.152
In Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, at issue was Brazil's import ban on re-
treaded tires except those originating in MERCOSUR countries.153 The
panel concluded that this measure violated the GATT requirement under
Article XI:1 that disallows quantitative restrictions on imports, and that it
was not justified under the Article XX(b) exception on the protection of
human health and life.15 4 For the purpose of judicial economy, the panel
found it unnecessary to examine the EC's separate claims under GATT
Articles 1:1, XIII:1, and Brazil's corresponding defenses under Article
XXIV and XX(d). 5 5 The EC, however, requested the Appellate Body to
complete the legal analysis on the unresolved issues (including the Article
XXIV defense) in the event it was to confirm certain panel findings.
Since the condition, upon which the EC's appeal was contingent, was not
fulfilled as a result of the reversal of the relevant panel findings, the Ap-
pellate Body declined to complete the legal analysis, avoiding the Article
XXIV issue.156
In two cases, the adjudicators dealt with the situation where an RTA
party applied safeguards on specific products from all countries except its
RTA counterparts even though the latter's products were initially in-
cluded in the respective investigations. In Argentina-Footwear (EC),
Argentina justified its MERCOSUR exemption with the argument that
safeguards otherwise imposed against MERCOSUR members would run
counter to Article XXIV:8 that, in its opinion, requires removal of intra-
bloc barriers including safeguards.' 57 On the basis of the contents of this
provision and the possibility of a gradual formation of the CU (i.e.,
MERCOSUR), the panel concluded that Argentina and other
MERCOSUR countries were, in fact, not prevented from imposing safe-
guard measures vis-A-vis each other.158 However, the Appellate Body re-
versed the panel findings-and consequently avoided the WTO-
151. Turkey Panel Report, supra note 143, 19 9.52-55.
152. Turkey Appellate Body Report, supra note 147, 1 60.
153. See Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/
DS332/R (June 12, 2007) (adopted Dec. 17, 2007).
154. Id. 1 5.44.
155. Id. 19 7.454-456.
156. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,$1 255-257, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) (adopted Dec. 17, 2007).
157. Panel Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, 9 8.93,
WT/DS121/R (June 25, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12, 2000).
158. Id. 91 8.96-102.
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compatibility test for MERCOSUR-on the grounds that the Article
XXIV issue was not properly before the panel:
In this case, we note that Argentina did not argue before the Panel
that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 provided it with a defence to a
finding of violation of a provision of the GATT 1994. As Argentina
did not argue that Article XXIV provided it with a defence against a
finding of violation of a provision of the GATT 1994, and as the
Panel did not consider whether the safeguard measures at issue were
introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets
the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV,
we believe that the Panel erred in deciding that an examination of
Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994 was relevant to its analysis of
whether the safeguard measures at issue in this case were consistent
with the provisions of Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on
Safeguards.' 59
The other case involving safeguard measures is United States-Line
Pipe Safeguards. The panel here observed that the exclusion by the
United States of NAFIA imports from global safeguards could be justi-
fied under Article XXIV if NAFTA itself meets WTO standards under
paragraphs five and eight of Article XXIV.16 0 Instead of scrupulously
examining, on their own, whether NAFTA indeed complies with Article
XXIV, the panelists simply expressed their satisfaction with the US evi-
dence of prima facie compliance.161 But the Appellate Body found the
panel's conclusion "moot" and with "no legal effect," because the Article
XXIV defense could have been considered only if the parallelism re-
quirement-that the scope of subject products in the investigation and
application of safeguards must be the same-had been met.162 Because
the U.S. measure was found to be inconsistent with the parallelism re-
quirement, there was no need for the adjudicators to examine the Article
XXIV issue.163
C. PROSPEcrs
The Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case made it clear that
Article XXIV defense will not be complete without examination of the
overall compatibility of an RTA with the provisions of Article XXIV.
This finding can be transposed, mutatis mutandis, to defense cases raised
under GATS Article V and the Enabling Clause. So far, the WTO adju-
dicating bodies have not conducted a comprehensive WTO-compatibility
159. Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
1 110, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12, 2000).
160. See Panel Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Cir-
cular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29, 2001)
(adopted Mar. 8, 2002).
161. Id. 1 7.142-146.
162. Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, $ 199, WT/DS202/AB/
R (Feb. 15, 2002) (adopted Mar. 8, 2002).
163. Id. %1 178-199.
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test on the pretext of the lack of competence, judicial economy, or the
absence of appeals. It appears that unless WTO members as main rule-
makers bring more clarity to the existing disciplines, the adjudicators will
try not to open Pandora's Box themselves.164 Therefore, we suggest that
if members fail to clarify the rules, they should at least send an encourag-
ing signal to the adjudicators with a view to activating judicial interpreta-
tions. This could be done, for instance, through the adoption of a
decision which would unequivocally reconfirm the interpretative author-
ity of panels and the Appellate Body on regional trade issues.'6 5 Such a
decision would complement paragraph twelve of the Understanding on
Article XXIV that renders RTA-related matters justiciable, and would
serve as a certain insurance policy against possible criticism of the judicial
way of "making law"-judicial "overreaching"-in the future.166
On the other hand, the WTO-compatibility test will hardly be avoided
where RTAs as such are contested in complaints. In spite of the fact that
no member has used this track to date, this option still remains open. For
example, if country A's RTA removes duties in intra-trade for a very lim-
ited number of products, country B (a non-RTA party) may file a WTO
complaint against A (and other parties) over the violation by the RTA of
the SAT requirement. Because A's RTA does not satisfy SAT under Ar-
ticle XXIV and thus fails to be an appropriate exception to the MFN
principle, country B may claim that duty-free treatment under this RTA
should be extended on an MFN basis to the rest of the members. In the
case of an RTA with a non-WTO member,167 a complaining party may
similarly ask for the MFN extension of RTA benefits. In both situations,
panelists will have no choice but to consider the complainant's claim on
its merits.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we revisited the WTO "control" functions in relation to
RTAs in three independent but interlinked areas. These functions can-
not, of course, keep regionalism from growing. Nevertheless, the instru-
ments available in the three areas are designed to ensure that RTAs
remain within the reach of the WTO. On the basis of the observations in
this analysis, the state of play in and prospects of the use of these instru-
ments can be evaluated, in brief, as follows.
With respect to rule-making reforms, the biggest success in this field
has so far been the establishment of the TM. The 2006 Decision has im-
proved the multilateral review procedures on RTAs and removed, in
principle, jurisdictional overlap between the CRTA/CTD and the adjudi-
164. See Mavroidis, supra note 149, at 209-10.
165. Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 548.
166. Id.
167. For problematic aspects of RTAs between a WTO member and non-member, see
Won-Mog Choi, Legal Problems of Making Regional Trade Agreements with Non-
WTO-Member States, 8 J. IN-r'i ECON. L. 825 (2005).
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cating bodies-something that, in our opinion, greatly contributes to the
strengthening of the institutional balance within the WTO.168 On the
other hand, the persistent inaction of members to clarify the substantive
rules may continue to discourage judicial reviews of RTAs, though it will
hardly affect the transparency process as such. Since clearly-defined re-
quirements for regional arrangements have a direct bearing on what
should be considered a WTO-consistent RTA, members should intensify
their rule-making efforts through negotiations or, failing that, multilateral
interpretations and amendment procedures.
The multilateral surveillance mechanism, which used to legally examine
RTAs, concentrates now on their transparency only. The TM greatly fa-
cilitates WTO members' understanding of individual regional arrange-
ments, and may provide some food for thought on how the existing rules
could be improved in light of today's realities. For instance, numerical
levels of intra-RTA trade liberalization shown in Secretariat's factual
presentationS169 may help members clarify the SAT concept, taking into
account the practice to date. Moreover, the operation of the TM may
reveal gaps in the transparency process itself, providing grounds for fur-
ther rule-making initiatives in this field. As considered above, the occa-
sional practice of dual notifications has already provoked members' calls
for making joint actions by RTA parties mandatory and consolidation of
all the TM procedures under the CRTA. In addition to its potential im-
pact on rule-making, the TM may also be tied to future WTO litigation
cases when, for instance, RTA notifications or factual presentations be-
come an issue for judicial considerations. Systemic implications of RTAs
for the multilateral trading system are one of the most urgent items for
WTO review in the near future-something that requires closer coopera-
tion of members in the adoption of appropriate procedures.
Finally, dispute resolution is also a very important field where the
WTO can perform its "control" functions, albeit to a limited extent. Judi-
cial reviews of RTAs are case-specific and dependent on initiations by
interested members only. So far, complaints have targeted only specific
measures adopted under CUs and FTAs. With the launch of the TM, the
dispute settlement procedures remain the only channel through which il-
legal RTAs could be challenged. Moreover, this track could provide nec-
essary interpretations of many ambiguous terms used in WTO disciplines
concerning regional trade. But the irony is that the adjudicators have
implicitly shown their unwillingness to embark upon overall WTO-consis-
tency examinations of the RTAs at issue. This kind of judicial passivism is
partly due to the fact that members themselves do not hesitate to chal-
lenge a particular RTA, and that the rule-making process reached a vir-
tual stalemate. But we anticipate that, with the further proliferation of
168. Shadikhodjaev, supra note 97, at 540.
169. For one of the most recent examples, see Committee on Regional Trade Agree-
ments, Factual Presentation-Free Trade Agreement between China and Costa Rica
(Goods and Services), § 3.1.2, WT/REG310/1 (Jan. 16, 2013).
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RTAs and increasing trade-diversion or other negative effects on non-
parties, more disputes will come up in the future requiring a more active
role of adjudicators on RTA issues. It is thus not ruled out that legal
interpretations that may be produced in the course of dispute settlement
will be considered as useful benchmarks in future rule-making
developments.
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